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Abstract 
 
In the Edwardian era, the British Dominions adopted policies of imperial preference, amid a period of 
rising imports from the United States and industrial Continental Europe. Hitherto, there has been no 
econometric assessment of whether these policies produced an intra-Empire trade diversion, as 
intended. This paper focuses on New Zealand’s initial policy of imperial preference, codified in the 
Preferential and Reciprocal Trade Act of 1903. New Zealand’s policy was unique insofar as it extended 
preference to only certain commodities. Using a commodity panel regression, this paper exploits the 
cross-commodity variation in the extension of preference, but finds no statistically significant effect of 
preference on either the Empire share or, specifically, the British share of New Zealand’s imports. This 
finding is corroborated by an alternative empirical approach involving propensity-score matching.  
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I. Introduction 
In the span of a decade, Canada (1897), the South African Customs Union (1903), New Zealand 
(1903), and Australia (1907) all adopted policies which extended some measure of preference, in 
their tariff legislation, to imports from Britain.1 These Edwardian policies of imperial preference 
prefigured the more extensive system of preferential trade that emerged in the British Empire 
during the interwar era. Until the Import Duties Act of 1932, Britain’s adherence to a policy of 
(mostly) free trade left hardly any scope for reciprocating the preferences which the Dominions 
extended to Britain’s exports.2 When, during the Great Depression, Britain ultimately did abandon 
its longstanding policy of free trade, reciprocal preferential trade agreements—the “Ottawa 
agreements”—were swiftly concluded between Britain and each of its Dominions. Whether (and 
to what extent) the Ottawa agreements of 1932 produced an intra-empire trade diversion has been 
the subject of recent research (e.g. Jacks 2014; de Bromhead et al. 2017). 
 Comparatively less attention has been given to assessing the effect of the preferential trade 
policies that were adopted by the Dominions before the First World War.3 Focusing on the case of 
New Zealand, this paper considers whether Edwardian imperial preference diverted trade toward 
the Empire. New Zealand’s policy of imperial preference, first codified in the Preferential and 
Reciprocal Trade Act of 1903, was unique among the Dominions’ policies insofar as it applied 
preference to only selected commodities and not to others.4 Window glass, for example, would 
                                                     
1 The policies of imperial preference initially adopted by the South African Customs Union and 
New Zealand extended preference to the entire British Empire, not just Britain. 
2 Britain began to depart from its longstanding policy of free trade during the First World War, with 
the McKenna Duties on mainly motorcars, and further during the 1920s, with various legislation imposing 
duties on assorted manufactured imports. Some of the legislation even provided for a reduction in the duty 
on imports from the British Empire. However, as the dutiable share of Britain’s imports was quite small, 
and as Britain imported barely any manufactured commodities from the Empire, the scope for reciprocating 
the preferences that the Dominions extended to Britain’s exports was negligible. For a discussion of the 
minor imperial preferences in Britain’s tariff system before the Import Duties Act of 1932, see McGuire 
(1939, pp. 258-61). 
3 Throughout this paper, the term Dominion is anachronistic when applied to New Zealand, which 
was not officially proclaimed a Dominion until 1907. Yet, the error of the anachronistic use is outweighed 
by the convenience of the term for referring to Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and South Africa, which 
were all higher-income, settler colonies with responsible self-government.  
4 As New Zealand’s policy of imperial preference went unreciprocated by Britain before the First 
World War, the use of the word ‘Reciprocal’ in the title of the act requires a brief explanation. The reciprocal 
character of the act derives from its granting authority to the Governor of New Zealand to enter into 
agreements with other British possessions (and foreign countries) “to reduce or abolish the duty on any 
article or articles the produce or manufacture of such country to an extent that the estimated revenue so 
remitted shall equal as nearly as possible the estimated revenue remitted by that country: Provided that no 
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have been subject to a lower duty if it had been imported from Britain than if it had been imported 
from Belgium. Yet, bottle glass would have been subject to a uniform duty regardless of its origin. 
New Zealand’s Preferential and Reciprocal Trade Act offers cross-commodity variation in the 
application of preference; the variation is not only unique, but also econometrically useful.  
In contrast, the other Dominions offered preference to all commodities. Canada, which 
emerged in the 1890s as a battleground market between American and British manufactured 
exports, was at the vanguard of the movement for imperial preference.5 In 1897, it offered 
preference in the form a one-eighth reduction of the duties on imports from Britain. This reduction 
was soon increased to one-quarter in 1898 and one-third in 1900 (Knowles 1930, p. 382). Without 
cross-commodity variation it would be difficult to disentangle the effect, or lack of effect, of 
Canada’s policy of imperial preference from the annual fluctuations in the competitiveness of 
British exports; in the late nineteenth century, Britain’s export prices were pro-cyclical (Ford 1963, 
p. 332). This paper represents the first commodity-level econometric study of Edwardian imperial 
preference. In this respect, it departs from Mitchener and Weidenmier (2008) and Magee and 
Thompson (2010), whose analyses of pre-WWI intra-empire trade diversion relied upon aggregate 
bilateral trade flows. 
The following section of this paper surveys the literature on imperial preference and trade 
diversion during both the pre-WWI and interwar eras. The literature for the interwar era is 
especially worth considering, since it includes a couple of studies relying on trade data 
disaggregated to the commodity and sector levels. The next section chronicles the rise of non-
Empire imports and then addresses the historical development of imperial preference in New 
Zealand, as well as the structure of the policy that New Zealand instituted in 1903. In the next 
section, a commodity panel regression is estimated for the empire share and British share of New 
Zealand’s imports from 1899-1906, with the margin of preference serving as the explanatory 
variable of interest. This paper finds that New Zealand’s Preferential and Reciprocal Trade Act 
did not produce any statistically significant intra-Empire trade diversion. An alternative empirical 
approach of propensity-score matching lends further support to this finding. The final section 
                                                     
such agreement shall have effect until ratified by Parliament” (Preferential and Reciprocal Trade Act, 1903, 
no. 78, 3 Edw. VII). 
5 For a discussion of British and American competition in the Canadian market in the 1890s, see 
Saul (1960, pp. 169-87). 
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assesses whether this finding can be generalized for the Dominions. Other implications of this 
finding are then addressed. 
 
II. Literature 
Before 1914 
Russell (1947, p. 17) argued that imperial preference was instrumental in raising the value of the 
UK’s exports to the Dominions in the years preceding the First World War. With reference to New 
Zealand specifically, Russell attributed the rise in bilateral British exports from £6.9 million (1903) 
to £10.8 million (1913) to imperial preference. However, it would be naïve to conclude the efficacy 
of imperial preference from just the rise in the value of bilateral exports. Like the other Dominions, 
New Zealand’s population was growing rapidly. Moreover, during the same interval, the average 
price of New Zealand’s imports rose by 40% (calculated from Easton and Wilson 1984, pp. 36-7). 
Both of these trends would be expected to raise the value of New Zealand’s imports from Britain, 
irrespective of the adoption of imperial preference.6 On a per capita basis, the volume of New 
Zealand’s bilateral imports from Britain was probably not any higher in 1913 than in 1903.7 
Saul (1960, p. 217) doubted that Edwardian imperial preference raised the empire share of 
the Dominions’ imports, though he did identify Canada as a likely exception.8 He observed that, 
because the Canadian policy of imperial preference involved lowering the duties on imports from 
Britain, British manufacturers were better able to compete against domestic Canadian 
manufacturers (as well as against foreign manufacturers) in the Canadian market. In this respect, 
Canada’s preferential policy was distinct from New Zealand’s policy, which raised the duties on 
imports from outside the Empire (for selected commodities) and, consequently, conferred no 
advantage on Empire imports vis-à-vis domestic production. After 1897, the British share of 
                                                     
6 Additionally, the value of New Zealand’s imports from Britain could have risen on account of 
increasing import intensity. However, New Zealand’s import-GNP ratio changed little between 1903 (24%) 
and 1913 (25%), as calculated using the data reported in Rankin (1992). In this respect, New Zealand was 
consistent with the world pattern of constant “trade openness” from 1870-1913, recently documented by 
Federico and Tena-Junguito (2017).  
7 Based upon Russell’s (f.o.b.) values of bilateral British exports to New Zealand and the annual 
population of New Zealand reported in Rankin (1992, pp. 58-9), the per capita volume of the bilateral trade 
declined by 14% from 1903-13, if the value of trade is deflated by Easton and Wilson’s (1984, pp. 36-7) 
index of New Zealand import prices, or increased by 3%, if the value is deflated by Imlah’s (1958, p. 98) 
index of British export prices. 
8 Platt (1993, p. 107) took a similar view on the efficacy of imperial preference in Canada. 
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Canadian imports did increase for textiles, with British imports mainly displacing domestic 
Canadian production, rather than displacing imports from other countries (Saul 1960, pp. 182-3). 
Overall, however, the British share of Canadian imports declined in the years following the 
adoption of imperial preference, although the severity of the decline may well have been mitigated 
by imperial preference. 
Australia was the last of the Dominions to implement imperial preference. Australia’s 
policy of imperial preference, introduced as part of the protectionist Lyne Tariff of 1907, included 
an entirely separate preferential tariff schedule for imports from Britain.9 However, the policy 
proved futile. According to Sullivan (2001, p. 52), the margins of preference were too little and 
the British share of Australian imports was already so high that the Lyne Tariff produced no 
discernable intra-Empire trade diversion. Still, Irwin (2006, p. 323), in passing, observed from a 
gravity model of Australian trade that the imperial preference enacted as part of the Lyne Tariff 
appeared “to have the slight effecting of halting the decline in intra-Commonwealth trade that was 
evident up to this point”. 
Magee and Thompson (2010) followed a systematic approach in assessing the effect of 
pre-WWI preferential trade policies in the British Empire. Their evidence took the form of 
purposely-calculated quinquennial measures of “revealed advantage” for each Dominion. 
Revealed advantage is calculated as the share of per capita income in a Dominion allocated toward 
the purchase of British goods, normalized for the share of per capita income in industrial 
northwestern Europe allocated toward the purchase of British goods. Magee and Thompson (2010, 
p. 128) pointed out that the revealed advantages of the Dominions were no higher in the early 
twentieth-century, following the institution of imperial preference, than in the late nineteenth-
century. As they argued, imperial preference per se did not raise the British share of the 
Dominions’ imports.10 Rather, their general argument was that the overall high levels of intra-
Empire trade were sustained by common consumption patterns and interpersonal networks.  
Curiously, Magee and Thompson’s argument does not quite hold for New Zealand, a fact 
which went unaddressed in their discussion. The revealed advantage measure for New Zealand is 
                                                     
9 As Sullivan (2001, p. 50) noted, the Lyne Tariff actually raised the average tariff on British 
imports, but raised the average tariff on foreign imports even more, thus creating a margin of preference. 
10 It should be observed that their approach does not permit the identification of whether policies 
of imperial preference offset or retarded an otherwise decline in Britain’s revealed advantage in Dominion 
markets. 
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higher in any one of the twentieth-century quinquennia (1900-4, 1905-9, and 1910-3) than in any 
one of the nineteenth-century quinquennia (Magee and Thompson 2010, p. 123). The revealed 
advantage for New Zealand averaged 3.9 from 1870-99 and 4.8 from 1900-13. This difference 
suggests a strengthening of Britain’s advantage in New Zealand, precisely when New Zealand 
legislated imperial preference.11 It is also consistent with the heightened consumer preference for 
British goods in Edwardian New Zealand described by Platt (1993, pp. 112-13). Was this 
Edwardian improvement in Britain’s revealed advantage in New Zealand determined by trade 
policy? 
The argument of Magee and Thompson, i.e. that imperial preference did not produce an 
intra-British-Empire trade diversion, runs contrary to the finding of Mitchener and Weidenmier 
(2008) that policies of imperial preference, including non-British imperial preference, were a 
statistically significant determinant of bilateral trade flows. Using a gravity model of trade, 
Mitchener and Weidenmier (2008, p. 1826) estimated that a policy of imperial preference 
increased intra-empire bilateral trade between 26% and 168%, depending upon the specification. 
 
Interwar era 
Cross-sectional gravity models were estimated by Eichengreen and Irwin (1995) for the years 1928 
and 1935. These cross-sectional regressions incorporated a dummy variable for (bidirectional) 
bilateral trade flows between countries which were both members of the British Empire. In 1928, 
bilateral trade among the countries of the British Empire was substantially higher than would have 
been predicted from just the conventional gravity variables, including distance and the product of 
the trading partners’ GDPs. This finding could be attributed to commercial networks and 
consumption patterns in the British Empire, but possibly also to the preferential policies of the 
Dominions. The coefficient of the dummy variable for intra-British-Empire bilateral trade 
increases between the 1928 and 1935 cross-sectional regressions, and the difference between the 
magnitudes of the coefficients is statistically significant. Eichengreen and Irwin (1995, pp. 15-16) 
inferred from the higher coefficient a trade-diverting effect of the Ottawa agreements. 
                                                     
11 The strengthening of Britain’s revealed advantage in New Zealand should not be conflated with 
a strengthening of Britain’s competitiveness in this market, since the increase in the revealed advantage 
could have arisen from a decline in the normalization factor: the share of per capita income in industrial 
northwestern Europe allocated toward the purchase of British goods. 
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 Using panel data on Britain’s imports disaggregated by both commodity and country of 
origin, de Bromhead et al. (2017, p. 32) found that the system of preferential tariffs and quotas 
adopted by Britain in 1932 explains well more than half of the increase in the empire share of 
Britain’s imports between 1930 (27%) and 1935 (39%). They ascribed to trade policy a dominant 
role in the orientation of Britain’s imports toward the Empire in the interwar era. Their finding 
invites the question: did the pre-WWI policies of imperial preference orient Britain’s exports 
toward the Empire? According to Schlote (1952, p. 166-7), the empire share of Britain’s exports 
increased from 32% in 1900 to 37% in 1913.12 In view of de Bromhead et al.’s conclusive and 
explanative results for the interwar era, it would be reasonable to expect that trade policy 
contributed to the rising empire share of Edwardian Britain’s exports. Such a proposition is 
considered for the case of New Zealand. 
 Focusing on the country-specific case of New Zealand rightly leads to the question of 
whether the findings of this paper can be generalized for the system of imperial preference which 
arose among the several Dominions before the First World War. In this respect, the literature for 
the interwar era provides a cautionary analogue. Whereas de Bromhead et al. found that the Ottawa 
agreements explained the majority of the increase in the empire share of Britain’s imports, Jacks 
(2014) found little evidence that the agreements raised the share of the eight Ottawa signatory 
countries in either Canada’s exports or imports. In the four quarters following the enactment of the 
Ottawa agreements in the final quarter of 1932, the growth in the value of Canada’s trade with 
signatory countries was not significantly different from the growth in the value of Canada’s trade 
with non-signatory countries (Jacks 2014, pp. 27-8). At the sector level, there is scattered evidence 
of an Ottawa effect, such as in Canadian imports of ‘iron and its products’, presumably from 
Britain. Nonetheless, at the aggregate level, Jacks doubts that the Ottawa agreements had an 
appreciable effect on the empire share of Canada’s trade, which largely consisted of its bilateral 
trade with the United States. The case of Canada illustrates that even a watershed in trade policy, 
such as the Ottawa agreements, might do little to countervail the effects of gravity—distance and 
economic mass—on the country composition of trade. 
 
 
                                                     
12 The Empire share of Britain’s exports had been stagnant in preceding decades: 34% (1880) and 
33% (1890).  
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III. The Movement toward Imperial Preference in New Zealand 
Increasing non-Empire imports 
Both before and after the Preferential and Reciprocal Trade Act of 1903, the vast majority of New 
Zealand’s imports were from the Empire, especially Britain. In 1902, the Empire accounted for 
83% of New Zealand’s imports, while Britain alone accounted for 60%. Indeed, the British share 
of New Zealand’s imports was quite high, even among the Dominions.13 Nevertheless, foreign 
industrial countries began to make incursions into the New Zealand market in the 1890s, such that 
these countries supplied a substantial share of New Zealand’s imports by the beginning of the 
twentieth century. Figure 1 illustrates the shares of the United States, Germany, and Belgium in 
New Zealand’s imports. On the eve of imperial preference in 1902, these countries accounted for 
more than four-fifths of the 17% of imports from outside the Empire. 
Among the foreign industrial countries, the United States held the greatest share of New 
Zealand’s imports. From 1890-1902, the share of the United States doubled from 5.7% to 11.6%, 
although the majority of the increase occurred after 1896. The rising share of the United States in 
the New Zealand’s imports closely accords with the “surge” of American manufactured exports in 
the late 1890s, which was explained by Irwin (2003). In the late 1890s, the American price of iron 
ore declined relative to the British price of iron, resulting in the United States attaining 
international competitiveness in iron, steel, and manufactures thereof (Irwin 2003, p. 369). New 
Zealand’s trade statistics confirm that imports from the United States were concentrated in these 
commodities. While the American share of total imports was 11.2% from 1900-2, during the same 
interval its share was 38% for iron and steel fencing wire and 45% for iron nails. Moreover, the 
United States was a leading supplier to New Zealand of those manufactured commodities suited 
to an agrarian, settler society. From 1900-2, 42% of imported ploughs and harrows and 95% of 
imported axes and hatchets were sourced from the United States. Commodities such as these 
enjoyed a much larger domestic market in the United States than in more urbanized Britain, and 
production mostly occurred in the former country. It should also be observed that, for various 
agricultural implements and machinery, Canada was a non-negligible “third place” supplier, 
following the United States and Britain. 
 
                                                     
13 For a discussion of some of the reasons for the high share of Britain in New Zealand’s imports, 
see Varian (2017, p. 241). 
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Figure 1.   Non-Empire share of New Zealand’s imports, 1890-1902 
 
Source: Calculated from New Zealand official year-book, various years. 
 
 Industrialization in Continental Europe bore repercussions for the country composition of 
New Zealand’s imports. Although the share of industrial Europe in imports was much smaller than 
that of the United States, it was steadily rising throughout the 1890s. From 1890-1902, Germany’s 
share increased from 0.8% to 1.9%, and Belgium’s share from 0.1% to 0.8%. Imports from these 
countries encompassed commodities from relatively labor-intensive manufacturing industries in 
which late-Victorian Britain was comparatively disadvantaged (Varian 2016). For example, New 
Zealand imported from Belgium large quantities of window glass, a relatively labor-intensive 
manufactured commodity. From 1900-2, an impressive 62% of pianos were imported from 
Germany.14 Altogether, the Heckscher-Ohlinian manufacturing comparative advantages of (labor-
economizing) Britain and (labor-utilizing) industrial Europe were borne out in the New Zealand 
market. 
                                                     
14 Incidentally, the surprisingly high share of pianos in New Zealand’s total imports (0.8%) 
underscores the affluence of Edwardian New Zealand, which, in 1899, overtook Britain as the country with 
the highest GDP per capita in the world (Maddison 2003).  
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 The rise in imports from Germany, in particular, alarmed some of New Zealand’s 
lawmakers to a degree disproportionate to the 2% of imports coming from this industrial parvenu. 
During the parliamentary debate over what would become the Preferential and Reciprocal Trade 
Act, John McLachlan, the representative from Ashburton, boldly stated, “I owe the German no 
debt of gratitude, and why should I allow him to come here, or his products either. When I go into 
a shop to buy anything, if they offer me a German article I will not deal there” (Parliamentary 
Debates, 1903, vol. 127, p. 784). An Anglo-German commercial rivalry in the decades before the 
First World War has been long-established in the historical literature (Hoffman 1933). In New 
Zealand, this rivalry, exaggerated in the minds of certain lawmakers, contributed to a policy 
intended to raise the share of imports from Britain and—it may be similarly emphasized—reduce 
the share of imports from Germany.  
 
The Preferential and Reciprocal Trade Act of 1903  
There were some minor precursors to New Zealand’s policy of imperial preference. First, in 
distinguishing between Australian wine and non-Australian wine, New Zealand’s tariff schedule 
exhibited a small preference for the Empire in the years before 1903; the duty was 5s per gallon of 
Australian wine and 6s per gallon of non-Australian wine. Second, New Zealand did actually 
negotiate a bilateral preferential trade agreement with the pre-Federation colony of South 
Australia. Under the Customs Duties Reciprocity Act of 1895, New Zealand admitted duty-free 
South Australian dried fruits, olive oil, and salt (Customs Duties Reciprocity Act, 1895, no. 74, 59 
Vict.). South Australian wine was admitted at a much reduced duty of 2s 6d per gallon. In 
exchange, South Australia removed the duty on imports of barley, hops, oats, and horses from New 
Zealand. This somewhat obscure piece of legislation pertained to only a trifling amount of New 
Zealand’s total trade. In 1896, following the implementation of the act, the share of South Australia 
in New Zealand’s imports was still just 0.4%. The Customs Duties Reciprocity Act is more 
noteworthy for its provision authorizing the Colonial Treasurer of New Zealand to negotiate 
similar agreements with other Australian colonies. In this respect, the act was an overture toward 
intra-Australasian, if not intra-Empire, preference. However, New Zealand made no further 
advance in this direction until the Preferential and Reciprocal Trade Act of 1903. 
 While the declining empire share of New Zealand’s imports served as the longer-term 
context for the passage of the act, a more immediate impetus came from the 1902 Colonial 
Varian 11 
 
Conference among Britain and the Dominions. With an aim of strengthening the commercial bonds 
of the British Empire, the conference passed a resolution calling for the adoption of preferential 
trade policies (Zebel 1967, pp. 142-3). The resulting system would entail some measure of 
reciprocal preferential access between the British and Dominion markets. Of course, a prerequisite 
for Britain extending preference to imports from the Dominions was an abandonment of free trade, 
an increasingly likely prospect in early Edwardian Britain. After the conference, Joseph 
Chamberlain, the Colonial Secretary of Britain and chair of the conference, went on to campaign 
for tariff reform, consisting of both protective duties and imperial preferences. Meanwhile, Prime 
Minister Richard Seddon, New Zealand’s representative at the conference and also an ardent 
imperialist, returned to New Zealand with the objective of implementing imperial preference. 
 The Preferential and Reciprocal Trade Act was passed on 24 November 1903 and went 
into immediate effect (Preferential and Reciprocal Trade Act, 1903, no. 78, 3 Edw. VII). 
Preference took the form of additional duties on 37 commodities (corresponding to 44 
commodities in New Zealand’s trade statistics) imported from outside the Empire. Of the 44 
commodities covered by the act, 11 non-dutiable commodities were subject to a 20% ad valorem 
duty if originating from outside the Empire. 32 dutiable commodities were subject to an additional 
duty equal to half of the pre-existing duty if originating from outside the Empire. For example, 
prior to the passage of the act, the duty on imported boots and shoes was 22.5% ad valorem 
irrespective of origin. After passage of the act, boots and shoes imported from the Empire were 
still dutiable at 22.5% ad valorem, but boots and shoes imported from outside the Empire were 
dutiable at 33.75% ad valorem (22.5% + 11.25% additional duty). A single commodity, cement, 
was subject to an additional duty equal to the preexisting duty. The commodities covered by the 
act are listed in Table 1. While the act took effect on 24 November 1903, non-Empire imports 
covered by the act would be exempted from the additional duties until 31 March 1904, if it could 
be “proved to the satisfaction of the Collector” that the goods were ordered before 16 November 
1903. For this reason, 1903 and 1904 are transition years in New Zealand’s adoption of imperial 
preference.15 
 
                                                     
15 There were further exemptions, of lesser importance, which extended until 1906. These 
exemptions applied to printing paper purchased by newspapers; and rails and tramways for projects already 
planned (Preferential and Reciprocal Trade Act, 1903, no. 78, 3 Edw. VII). 
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Table 1.   Commodities covered by the Preferential and Reciprocal Trade Act of 1903 
 
Additional duty on non-Empire imports equal to the Empire duty 
Cement + 
 
Additional duty on non-Empire imports equal to ½ of the Empire duty 
Arms, Ammunition, and Explosives: Firearms* 
Basket- and Wicker-ware+ 
Bicycles and Tricycles* 
Bicycles and Tricycles: Materials for*† 
Boots and shoes+ 
Candles+ 
Carriages, etc.: Carriages 
Carriages, etc.: Carts, Drays, and Wagons 
Carriages, etc.: Perambulators and Go-carts 
Carriages, etc.: Materials for 
China, Porcelain, and Parianware 
Clocks 
Cordage+ 
Drugs, Chemicals, and Druggists’ Wares: Cream of Tartar+ 
Earthenware+ 
Fancy Goods 
Fish: Potted and Preserved+ 
Furniture and Upholstry 
Glass: Plate, Other Kinds+ 
Glass: Window+ 
Glassware+ 
Hardware, Holloware, and Ironmongery*+ 
Hops+ 
Instruments, Musical: Pianofortes 
Iron and Steel: Pipes and Fittings*+ 
Lamps, Lanterns, and Lampwick+ 
Leather Manufactures: Boot and Shoe Vamps, Uppers, and Laces+ 
Nails: Iron*+ 
Paper: Hangings+ 
Paper: Wrapping+ 
Plate and Platedware*+ 
Pumps*+ 
 
Duty of 20% ad valorem on non-Empire imports (Empire imports admitted free) 
Bicycles and tricycles, materials for*† 
Boots and Shoes: Gumboots+ 
Canvas+ 
Cordage: Iron and Steel*+ 
Instruments, Other Kinds: Surgical and Dental 
Iron and Steel: Angle*+ 
Iron and Steel: Bar, Rod, and Bolt*+ 
Iron and Steel: Rails*+ 
Iron and Steel: Sheet and Plate*+ 
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Machinery and Machines: Engines, Gas* 
Paper: Printing+ 
 
Source: Preferential and Reciprocal Trade Act, 1903, no. 78, 3 Edw. VII. 
Notes: The 44 commodities reported in this table do not exactly match the 37 commodities specified in the act. The 
discrepancy is due to the Statistics of the Colony of New Zealand reporting commodities at a more disaggregated 
level than specified in the act. Some of the commodities reported in this table represent a re-aggregation of the 
commodities reported in New Zealand’s trade statistics, so as to realize consistent commodity classifications for 
estimating Equation 1. The commodities reported in this table are the commodities for the purpose of Equation 1. 
* indicates an iron or steel commodity in Equation 2. + indicates a relatively undifferentiated commodity in 
Equation 3. † indicates a commodity with different variations treated separately in New Zealand’s tariff schedule.  
 
It is noteworthy that New Zealand did not follow the Canadian model of granting 
preference by means of tariff reductions, which would have advantaged British manufacturers at 
the expense of domestic manufacturers. At the dawn of the twentieth century, New Zealand’s 
manufacturing sector enjoyed a moderate degree of protection, which had been increased under 
the Customs and Excise Duties Act of 1895. While protection in New Zealand hardly produced an 
industrial economy, there can be little doubt that it gave at least some assistance to the growth of 
manufacturing, especially light manufacturing, in the closing years of the nineteenth century 
(Hawke 1985, p. 51). From 1891 to 1901, the number of employees in manufactories and works 
increased by more than three-fifths (calculated from Simkin 1951, p. 63).16 During the 
parliamentary debate over New Zealand’s policy of imperial preference, the Canadian model of 
tariff reductions was widely criticized as potentially injurious to New Zealand’s fledgling 
manufacturing sector.17 Thus, in 1903, New Zealand enacted a fundamentally protectionist piece 
of legislation involving only tariff increases. With regard to New Zealand’s policy of imperial 
preference, Condliffe (1930, p. 424) observed that “imperial preference has sometimes been used 
as a stalking-horse for local protection”. Still, the protection did differentiate between Empire and 
non-Empire imports, potentially leading to an intra-Empire trade diversion. 
 The scope of New Zealand’s initial policy of imperial preference should not be 
exaggerated. In 1902, the last full year preceding the act, the 44 covered commodities accounted  
                                                     
16 Yet, the non-Maori population increased by only 24% during the decade (calculated from Rankin 
1992, p. 58) 
17 The necessity of not harming domestic manufacturing was a recurrent theme in the debate over 
imperial preference. This position is best summarized in the words of Harry Bedford, the parliamentary 
representative from Dunedin City, “All we say is that British manufactures shall be favoured as against 
foreign manufactures; but we do not say that in our market the present inequality as between British and 
colonial industries shall in any way be mitigated. We will sacrifice the foreigner—and rightly—but we will 
not sacrifice ourselves in any way” (Parliamentary Debates, 1903, vol. 127, p. 737). 
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Table 2.   Highest value commodities covered by Preferential and Reciprocal Trade Act, 1902 
Commodity Value of imports (£) 
Share in total imports 
(per cent) 
Non-Empire share of 
commodity (per cent) 
 
Hardware, Holloware, 
and Ironmongery 
 
277,721 
 
2.5 
 
United States: 16.7 
Germany: 3.6 
Other Non-Empire: 0.3 
Total: 20.7 
 
Boots and Shoes 
 
191,264 
 
1.7 
 
United States: 42.4 
Other Non-Empire: 0.9 
Total: 43.3  
 
Fancy Goods 
 
145,720 
 
1.3 
 
Germany: 11.9 
United States: 6.0 
Japan: 4.8 
Other Non-Empire: 0.7 
Total: 23.3 
 
Iron and Steel: Bar, 
Bolt, and Rod 
 
118,032 
 
1.1 
 
Belgium: 3.6 
France: 1.7 
Other Non-Empire: 1.0 
Total: 6.3 
 
Iron and Steel: Pipes 
and Fittings 
 
112,291 
 
1.0 
 
United States: 13.9 
Belgium: 1.3 
Total: 15.3 
 
Paper: Printing 
 
108,439 
 
1.0 
 
United States: 42.0 
Germany: 1.3 
Other Non-Empire: 0.9  
Total: 44.2  
 
Instruments, Musical: 
Pianofortes 
 
84,841 
 
0.8 
 
Germany: 60.1 
United States: 1.1 
Total: 61.1 
  
Source: Calculated from Statistics of the colony of New Zealand, 1902. 
 
for only one-fifth of New Zealand’s imports by value. The value of the 44 commodities imported 
from outside the Empire accounted for just over 5% of the total value of New Zealand’s imports 
(or 28% of the value of the covered commodities). The act did cover several of the larger 
commodities in the composition of New Zealand’s imports; Table 2 provides descriptive statistics 
for the seven largest commodities. Nevertheless, the potential for an aggregate diversion of New 
Zealand’s imports toward the Empire was quite limited, at least until 1907. In that year, preference 
was extended to the majority of manufactured imports, causing New Zealand’s policy of imperial 
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preference to resemble closely the policies of the other Dominions. The next section of this paper, 
however, makes use of the differential application of imperial preference across commodities 
under New Zealand’s initial policy of imperial preference, which was in effect from 1903-7.     
 
IV. Empirical Analysis 
Commodity panel regression 
The main approach of this paper for estimating whether and, if so, to what extent the Preferential 
and Reciprocal Trade Act of 1903 diverted trade is a commodity panel regression for 1899-1906. 
The regression equation can be expressed as: 
∆ (
𝑀𝑐,𝑡,𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑖𝑟𝑒
𝑀𝑐,𝑡,𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑖𝑟𝑒+𝑀𝑐,𝑡,𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛
) = 𝛼 + 𝛽∆[(𝜏𝑐,𝑡,𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛 − 𝜏𝑐,𝑡,𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑖𝑟𝑒)(𝐸𝑐,𝑡)] + 𝛾𝑡 + 𝜀𝑐,𝑡  (1) 
in which M represents the value of imports,  the ad valorem equivalent tariff, and E the share of 
non-empire imports liable to additional “preferential duties”.18 The subscript c stands for the 
commodity, t for the year, empire for all areas of the British Empire (including Britain), and foreign 
for all areas outside of the British Empire.  
Thus, the dependent variable is the (differenced) empire share of New Zealand’s imports. 
The explanatory variable is the (differenced) absolute margin of preference: the difference between 
the ad valorem duty on imports from outside the Empire and the duty on imports from within the 
Empire. Accordingly, the absolute margin of preference takes a value of 0 for all commodities 
from 1899-1902. From 1903-1906, this variable takes a non-zero value for only those 44 
commodities covered by the act. While it would be desirable to estimate an alternative 
specification of the model with the relative margin of preference (c,t,foreign/c,t,empire – 1) as the 
explanatory variable, such a specification is precluded by the 11 commodities which were 
imported free from the Empire, but were dutiable from outside the Empire. 
 Since the Preferential and Reciprocal Trade Act went into effect in November 1903, only 
a small fraction of the non-empire imports of the 44 covered commodities were liable to additional 
duties in 1903. And since an exemption to the additional duties was granted through March 1904 
for commodities ordered before 16 November 1903, a substantial value of non-empire imports of 
covered commodities were not liable to additional duties in 1904. Because the implementation of 
                                                     
18 The Statistics of the Colony of New Zealand somewhat misleadingly refer to the additional duties 
imposed under the Preferential and Reciprocal Trade Act as “preferential duties”. Only by the absence of 
“preferential duties” is preference conferred. 
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the additional duties occurred over the course of two fiscal years, the absolute margin of preference 
is weighted by E, the share of non-empire imports of the (covered) commodity which were liable 
to additional duties in the given year.      
Year effects, represented by γt, capture annual changes in the empire share of imports 
common across commodities, whether covered by the act or not. Such year-on-year changes in the 
empire share of imports might result from a change in the average price of empire imports relative 
to non-empire imports. Given the dominant share of Britain within New Zealand’s imports from 
the Empire (and in total), it would be reasonable to suspect that the empire share of New Zealand’s 
imports fluctuated according to the British business cycle, with the empire share rising during 
periods when economic activity (and prices) were depressed in Britain. 
Data for the panel regression are obtained from the Statistics of the Colony of New Zealand, 
for the period from 1899-1906. The panel is ended in 1906, on account of the Preferential and 
Reciprocal Trade Act being superseded by the Tariff Act of 1907. From 1899-1906, a total of 675 
imported commodities are specified in New Zealand’s trade statistics. For the foregoing analysis, 
the number of commodities is reduced to 540. Since the trade statistics tended to become 
progressively disaggregated (e.g. carriages are disaggregated into carriages and automobiles), it is 
necessary to re-aggregate the commodities to their 1899 classifications so that there are consistent 
commodity classifications across the eight years. Several very narrowly defined commodities, for 
which the imported value was zero in at least one year, are dropped from the sample. Also excluded 
are gold, silver, and copper specie, as well as the single “commodity” of parcels post. For each 
commodity, the trade statistics differentiate between general imports and direct government 
purchases. The value of direct government purchases accounted for a small share of total imports, 
but sometimes accounted for a large share of the imports of individual commodities, especially 
capital goods likely used in the construction of public railways.19 The value of direct government 
purchases is excluded from the data in the analysis because New Zealand’s central and municipal 
governments, as well as its harbor boards, extended an institutional preference to British goods, 
which were sometimes more expensive than their foreign equivalents (Platt, 1993, p. 103). As this 
paper is concerned with a trade-diverting effect of the Preferential and Reciprocal Trade Act, direct 
government purchases, which were exempt from tariffs anyway, are excluded from the analysis.  
                                                     
19 For the unique history of government intervention in the New Zealand economy, see Le 
Rossignol and Stewart (1910). 
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Table 3.  Empire and British shares of New Zealand’s imports, 1899-1906  
 
Empire share of  New Zealand’s 
imports 
British share of New Zealand’s 
imports 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Absolute margin of 
preference 
32.28 
(28.73) 
30.09 
(30.49) 
25.71 
(28.19) 
22.40 
(29.50) 
Absolute margin of 
preference, one-year lag 
 8.41 
(31.14) 
 12.66 
(30.13) 
1900-1 
-0.31 
(1.16) 
 -2.86** 
(1.13) 
 
1901-2 
-0.76 
(1.16) 
-0.45 
(1.18) 
-1.66 
(1.13) 
1.20 
(1.14) 
1902-3 
-0.40 
(1.16) 
-0.09 
(1.18) 
-1.70 
(1.13) 
1.16 
(1.14) 
1903-4 
0.51 
(1.17) 
0.84 
(1.20) 
-0.96 
(1.15) 
1.92 
(1.16) 
1904-5 
0.46 
(1.16) 
0.73 
(1.20) 
-0.15 
(1.14) 
2.65** 
(1.16) 
1905-6 
2.49** 
(1.16) 
2.78** 
(1.19) 
-1.20 
(1.13) 
1.62 
(1.15) 
Constant 
-0.52 
(0.82) 
-0.84 
(0.84) 
0.90 
(0.80) 
-1.97** 
(0.81) 
Observations 3,780 3,240 3,780 3,240 
Notes: The dependent variables and the absolute margin of preference are differenced. Standard errors are noted in 
parentheses. The reference year is 1899-1900. All coefficients and standard errors have been scaled by a factor of 
100. ** indicates statistical significance at the 5% level. 
 
Altogether, the sample covers at least 95% of New Zealand’s total imports, including both direct 
government purchases and parcels post (but excluding specie), in every year except 1901 (92%) 
and 1904 (91%), when the total value of New Zealand’s imports included abnormally large values 
of railway plant imported by the government. 
The results of the estimation of the regression equation are reported in Table 3. None of 
the specifications include commodity fixed effects, since Hausman tests for each specification 
indicate that random effects are a more efficient estimation. Column 1 presents the results of the 
baseline specification. While the coefficient of the absolute margin of preference is expectedly 
positive, it is statistically insignificant. Column 2 includes a lagged variable for the absolute 
margin of preference, intended to capture any delayed effect of the act, which might result from 
importing firms slowly switching suppliers, perhaps not until 1905. Nevertheless, the inclusion of 
the lagged variable fails to evidence any relationship between the margin of preference and the 
empire share of New Zealand’s imports. Columns 3 and 4, which replicate columns 1 and 2 for 
the distinctly British share of imports, yield similar findings. 
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The literature on trade during the first era of globalization gives cause to examine whether 
the Preferential and Reciprocal Trade Act produced an intra-Empire trade diversion in certain 
categories of covered commodities, even if no trade diversion is evident for the 44 covered 
commodities as a whole. Irwin (2003) argued that a decline in the American price of iron ore 
relative to the British price of iron ore resulted in a phenomenal growth in American exports of 
iron, steel, and manufactures thereof, such as machinery, in the late 1890s. For these commodities, 
competition between Britain and the United States in third markets was especially intense moving 
into the Edwardian era. As Allen (1979, p. 913) observed, American and British steel prices were 
quite close in the opening years of the twentieth century. The question arises: did the additional 
duties of 1903 cause New Zealand to source a greater share of its iron and steel imports from 
Britain, or from the British Empire? In this regard, the difference between Britain and the British 
Empire is not entirely meaningless, as New Zealand did import iron and steel agricultural 
implements from Canada.  
 In a recent study, Huberman et al. (2017) focused on Belgian exports from 1870-1910. One 
of the findings from their gravity model was that variable trade costs, proxied by distance, were a 
negative and statistically significant determinant of the value of Belgium’s bilateral exports. 
Moreover, the (absolute) elasticity of bilateral exports to variable trade costs was inversely related 
to the degree of product differentiation. In their analysis, they divided Belgium’s export 
commodities into four categories, ranging from least differentiated (Category 1) to most 
differentiated (Category 4). The elasticity of exports to variable trade costs was nearly three times 
as large for Category 1 as for Category 4 (Huberman et al. 2017, p. 56). For the most differentiated 
commodities, such as transport equipment and machines, a fall in variable trade costs resulted in 
comparatively little increase in the value of bilateral exports. In imposing additional duties, the 
Preferential and Reciprocal Trade Act raised bilateral variable trade costs—tariffs were a 
determinant of bilateral trade costs (Jacks et al. 2010; Varian 2018)—between New Zealand and 
non-Empire trade partners. Given the findings of Huberman et al., it would follow that the resulting 
decline in the value of New Zealand’s bilateral imports from non-Empire trade partners (and, 
mechanically, the rise in its share of imports from the Empire) was most acute for the least 
differentiated commodities. Perhaps the Preferential and Reciprocal Trade Act produced an intra-
Empire trade diversion for the less differentiated among the 44 commodities it covered? 
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Table 4.  Iron/steel and less differentiated imports, 1899-1906  
 
Empire share of  New Zealand’s 
imports 
British share of New Zealand’s 
imports 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Absolute margin of 
preference x (iron/steel) 
41.88 
(42.60) 
 39.05 
(41.80) 
 
Absolute margin of 
preference x (less 
differentiated) 
 
26.98 
(34.85) 
 
21.66 
(34.19) 
Constant 
-0.53 
(0.82) 
-0.53 
(0.82) 
0.90 
(0.80) 
0.90 
(0.80) 
Observations 3,780 3,780 3,780 3,780 
Notes: The dependent variables and the absolute margin of preference are differenced. Year effects are included in 
the regression but not reported in the table. Standard errors are noted in parentheses. All coefficients and standard 
errors have been scaled by a factor of 100. 
 
  Of the 44 covered commodities, 15 have been identified as consisting mainly or entirely 
of iron or steel; these commodities are designated in Table 1. Relying on the categorization of 
Belgian export commodities by degree of differentiation reported in the appendix of Huberman et 
al. (2017, pp. 72-8), 29 of the 44 covered commodities have been identified as in Categories 1-3, 
not “capital intensive highly differentiated goods” (Category 4); these commodities are designated 
in Table 1. While a few of the covered commodities are not reported in the appendix to Huberman 
et al., it is sufficiently obvious whether or not these commodities are highly differentiated. 
Equation 1 is modified so that the absolute margin of preference is interacted with a dummy 
variable taking a value of 1 for iron and steel commodities (Iron): 
∆ (
𝑀𝑐,𝑡,𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑖𝑟𝑒
𝑀𝑐,𝑡,𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑖𝑟𝑒+𝑀𝑐,𝑡,𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛
) = 𝛼 + 𝛽∆[(𝜏𝑐,𝑡,𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛 − 𝜏𝑐,𝑡,𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑖𝑟𝑒)(𝐸𝑐,𝑡)(𝐼𝑟𝑜𝑛)] + 𝛾𝑡 + 𝜀𝑐,𝑡 (2) 
or, alternately, taking a value of 1 for not highly differentiated commodities (LessDifferentiated), 
specifically those commodities in Categories 1-3 in the appendix of Huberman et al.: 
∆ (
𝑀𝑐,𝑡,𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑖𝑟𝑒
𝑀𝑐,𝑡,𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑖𝑟𝑒+𝑀𝑐,𝑡,𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛
) = 𝛼 + 𝛽∆[(𝜏𝑐,𝑡,𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛 − 𝜏𝑐,𝑡,𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑖𝑟𝑒)(𝐸𝑐,𝑡)(𝐿𝑒𝑠𝑠𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑)] +
𝛾𝑡 + 𝜀𝑐,𝑡                (3) 
The results of the estimation of the regression equations are reported in Table 4, which indicates 
that the Preferential and Reciprocal Trade Act produced an intra-Empire trade diversion neither 
for iron and steel nor for relatively undifferentiated commodities, both categories of commodities 
marked by a particular intensity of competition in the Edwardian era. Once again, this finding is 
unaltered whether the Empire share or the British share is considered. 
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Propensity-score matching 
In the parliamentary debate over New Zealand’s initial policy of imperial preference, there were 
objections to the selective extension of preference to just certain commodities, with one 
representative observing that “The articles named in the schedule seem to have been selected in a 
most haphazard manner and without due consideration” (Parliamentary Debates, 1903, vol. 127, 
p. 786). There were some attempts to modify the schedule of covered commodities; motions for 
candles; glass: window; iron nails; paper: hangings; and paper: printing to be stricken from the 
schedule were unsuccessful. However, iron-wire netting and carriage shafts, spokes, and felloes 
were, in fact, removed from the proposed schedule. 
 It is not entirely evident from parliamentary records how the schedule of covered 
commodities was devised, although the conspicuous absence of agricultural machinery—much of 
it was imported from the United States—from the schedule led to the accusation that the proposed 
bill was “the farmers’ friend” (Parliamentary Debates, 1903, vol. 127, p. 892). Nevertheless, many 
of the commodities ultimately covered by the Preferential and Reciprocal Trade Act of 1903 were 
characterized by comparatively high non-Empire shares of imports. In this respect, the imported 
commodities covered by the act afforded considerable scope for an intra-Empire trade diversion. 
Due to this fact, the lack of any statistically significant relationship between the change in the 
absolute margin of preference and the change in the Empire share of imports, discerned in the 
previous section, stands as even more compelling evidence against the efficacy of the act.  
Still, the extension of preference (treatment) was almost certainly not random. Propensity-
score matching represents an alternative empirical approach that attempts to control for possible 
selection bias in the application of treatment. Propensity scores (for inclusion in the schedule of 
commodities covered by the Preferential and Reciprocal Trade Act) are estimated using a logit 
regression. Observable, explanatory variables are the Empire share (or British share) of the 
imported commodity in 1902 and a binary variable for whether the value of the commodity 
exceeded £10,000 in 1902, as minor commodities tended not to be covered by the act. Treated and 
non-treated commodities are matched based upon their propensity scores. An average treatment 
effect on the treated (ATET) is estimated, with the effect measured as the change in the Empire 
share (British share) of the imported commodity from 1902-4 or, alternately, from 1902-5. As 
Table 5 reports, none of the ATETs are statistically significant at any level. One of the drawbacks 
of this approach is that preference is a binary treatment rather than a continuous variable, i.e. the  
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Table 5.  Propensity-score matching: average effect of preference on treated, 1902-4/5 
 
Empire share of  New Zealand’s 
imports 
British share of New Zealand’s 
imports 
 1902-4 1902-5 1902-4 1902-5 
ATET 
-0.02 
(4.43) 
1.46 
(4.66) 
-2.48 
(2.56) 
-4.08 
(3.46) 
Treated 44 44 44 44 
Observations 540 540 540 540 
Notes: Standard errors are noted in parentheses. ATET and standard errors have been scaled by a factor of 100. 
 
absolute margin of preference. Nonetheless, the alternative empirical approach of propensity-score 
matching corroborates the earlier finding that the Preferential and Reciprocal Trade Act did not 
raise the Empire share of imports. 
 
V. Conclusion 
The Preferential and Reciprocal Trade Act of 1903 followed a decade-long rise in the share of 
New Zealand’s imports coming from the ascendant industrial countries of Belgium, Germany, and 
the United States. While the act sought to raise the Empire share and, in particular, the British 
share of New Zealand’s imports of those commodities it covered, it was ineffective in doing so. 
This finding is supported by both a commodity panel regression and a propensity-score matching 
estimation of the effect of imperial preference. Moreover, this finding holds for even those 
categories of commodities for which imperial preference would have been most expected to 
produce a trade diversion: iron, steel, and manufactures thereof, marked by closely aligned British 
and American prices in the early years of the twentieth century; and relatively undifferentiated 
commodities, for which demand was more price elastic. In sum, New Zealand’s initial policy of 
imperial preference did not cause an intra-Empire trade diversion, as intended.  
How useful is the case of New Zealand for judging the effectiveness of Edwardian imperial 
preference in the Dominions, more generally? The answer is: quite useful. Most of the 
commodities covered by the Preferential and Reciprocal Trade Act were subject to an additional 
duty equal to half of the pre-existing duty if originating from outside the Empire. Therefore, 
imports of these commodities from within the Empire paid a duty 1/3 less than the non-Empire 
duty. By 1900, the Canadian policy of imperial preference offered a 1/3 reduction in the duty on 
imports from Britain. Thus, most of the British goods covered by New Zealand’s initial policy of 
imperial preference received the same relative margin of preference in both Canada and New 
Zealand. This relative margin of preference was slightly more generous than the 1/4 reduction in 
Varian 22 
 
the duty on all Empire imports enacted in the South African Customs Union in 1903 (Knowles, 
1936, p. 302). Of course, caution should be exercised in extrapolating the findings of any case 
study. Simply because the relative margins of preference were equal between Canada and New 
Zealand does not imply that the ineffectiveness of New Zealand’s policy of imperial preference 
must also have been true of Canada’s policy. As Jacks (2014) has argued for the interwar era, the 
imperial preferences concluded at Ottawa in 1932 did not divert Canada’s exports toward the 
Empire. Yet, de Bromhead et al. (2017) found that the Ottawa agreements did divert Britain’s 
imports toward the Empire, and substantially so. With respect to the efficacy of imperial 
preference, individual Dominions could well have deviated from the more general pattern in the 
Edwardian era, just as in the interwar era. 
If nothing else, this paper shifts the weight of the evidence against the efficacy of 
Edwardian policies of imperial preference, as well as offering conclusive evidence for one of 
Britain’s four main Dominion markets: New Zealand. The finding of this paper is consistent with 
that of Magee and Thompson (2010, p. 128), who, on the basis of measures of revealed advantage, 
discounted the role of Edwardian policies of imperial preference in shaping demand for British 
goods. Indeed, the economic history literature has often regarded the Empire as a “soft market” 
for British exports, a sort of market in which Britain faced weak competition from other industrial 
countries.20 To be clear, this paper has not argued against the Edwardian British Empire as a soft 
market. Rather, if the British Empire can rightly be called a soft market, then the evidence suggests 
that its softness was not due to trade policy. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
20 For a noteworthy contribution to this debate that also summarises it well, see Thompson and 
Magee (2003). 
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